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Unlike natural gas-fired generation, renewable generation (e.g., from wind, solar, and 
geothermal power) is largely immune to fuel price risk.  If ratepayers are rational and value 
long-term price stability, then – contrary to common practice – any comparison of the levelized 
cost of renewable to gas-fired generation should be based on a hedged gas price input, rather 
than an uncertain gas price forecast.  This paper compares natural gas prices that can be locked 
in through futures, swaps, and physical supply contracts to contemporaneous long-term 
forecasts of spot gas prices.  We find that from 2000 -2003, forward gas prices for terms of 2-10 
years have been considerably higher than most contemporaneous long-term gas price forecasts.  
This difference is striking, and implies that comparisons between renewable and gas-fired 
generation based on these forecasts over this period have arguably yielded results that are 
biased in favor of gas-fired generation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The cost of generating electricity from renewable resources has declined dramatically 
over the past decade.  As revealed by recent long-term power purchase agreements, the cost of 
wind power in particular now ranges from 2.5¢-4¢/kWh (including the impact of federal tax 
incentives) throughout much of the United States.  At such levels, wind power is potentially 
competitive with new gas-fired generation, and utilities, regulators, and resource planners are 
beginning to compare wind to gas-fired generation on the basis of economics alone.  A critical 
component of any such comparison, however, should be an assessment and quantification of the 
relative risks associated with renewable energy – both positive (e.g., reduced environmental 
compliance risk) and negative (e.g., resource variability).1  This paper analyzes just one such 
risk:  the ability of renewable generation to mitigate natural gas fuel price risk. 
Against the backdrop of increasing – and increasingly volatile – natural gas prices, 
renewable energy resources, which by their nature are immune to natural gas fuel price risk, 
provide a potential economic benefit.  Unlike many contracts for natural gas-fired electricity 
generation, renewable generation is typically sold under fixed-price contracts.2  Assuming that 
electricity consumers are rational (and therefore prefer the less risky of two otherwise identical 
expected cash flows), a retail electricity supplier that is looking to expand its resource portfolio 
(or a policymaker interested in evaluating different resource options) should compare the cost of 
fixed-price renewable generation to the hedged or guaranteed cost of natural gas-fired 
generation, rather than to projected costs based on uncertain gas price forecasts.3  Nonetheless, 
utilities and others often compare the costs of renewable to gas-fired generation using as their 
fuel price input long-term gas price forecasts that are inherently uncertain, rather than long-term 
natural gas forward prices that can actually be locked in.  This practice raises the critical question 
of how these two price streams – i.e., forwards and forecasts – compare. 
Building on earlier work relating to fuel price risk (e.g., Awerbuch 1993, 1994, 2003; 
Kahn and Stoft 1993; Humphreys and McClain 2002), in this paper we compare prices that can 
be locked in through long-term traditional gas-based hedging instruments (e.g., futures, swaps, 
and fixed-price physical supply contracts) to contemporaneous forecasts of spot natural gas 
prices, with the purpose of identifying any systematic differences between the two.  Although 
our data are quite limited, we find that from November 2000 through 2003, forward gas prices 
for terms of 2-10 years have been considerably higher than most natural gas spot price forecasts.  
This difference is striking, and implies that resource planning and modeling exercises based on 
these forecasts over this period have yielded results that are biased (with respect to fuel price 
risk) in favor of gas-fired generation.   
                                                 
1 For example, Bachrach et al. (2003) catalog the relative risks of renewable and gas-fired generation, and how those 
risks are treated in long-term electricity contracts.  Hoff (1997) provides an analytical framework for evaluating a 
number of different risk types, while Cavanagh et al. (1993) and Repetto and Henderson (2003) specifically examine 
environmental compliance risk in the electricity industry.  Brooks et al. (2003), Electrotek (2003), Dragoon (2003), 
and Hirst (2002) each estimate the cost of integrating significant amounts of intermittent wind power into different 
utility grid systems. 
2 While our analysis and results are presented in the context of comparing renewable to gas-fired generation, they 
are equally applicable to comparisons of other stable-priced forms of generation (e.g., coal or nuclear power) or 
demand reduction (e.g., energy efficiency) to variable-price gas-fired generation. 
3 Again, although this article focuses exclusively on fuel price risk, the cost of fuel (and its impact on total 
generation costs) is only one of many important considerations involved in any resource comparison.  For example, 
the relative dispatchability of generating resources – regardless of levelized costs – may be of prime importance in 
some instances. 
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Although from a policy and analytic standpoint these empirical results are sufficiently 
interesting on their own, we spend the majority of this article examining several potential 
explanations for our empirical findings.  Specifically, within the context of the extensive (though 
inconclusive) treatment of this subject within the literature, we first discuss the possibility that 
hedging is not costless.4  We then consider the possibility that the spot price forecasts we employ 
have been biased downwards, or that other data or sampling problems are driving the empirical 
premiums.  We find none of these potential explanations to be either fully satisfying or easily 
refutable.  Regardless of the explanation, however, the implications of our analysis remain the 
same:  when comparing fixed-price renewable to variable-price gas-fired generation, forward gas 
prices are the most appropriate fuel price input if long-term price stability is valued. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
For better or worse, natural gas has become the fuel of choice for new power plants being 
built across the United States.  According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
natural gas combined-cycle and combustion turbine power plants accounted for 96% (138 GW 
out of 144 GW total) of the total generating capacity added in the U.S. between 1999 and 2002 
(EIA 2003).  Looking ahead, the EIA expects that gas-fired technology will account for 61% of 
the 355 GW of new generating capacity projected to come on-line in the US through 2025, 
increasing the nationwide market share of gas-fired generation from 18% in 2002 to 22% in 2025 
(EIA 2004).  While the data are specific to the US, natural gas-fired generation is making similar 
advances in other countries as well. 
With increasing competition for dwindling domestic natural gas supplies, it is likely that 
gas prices will be as or more volatile than they have been in the past.  Figure 1 shows natural gas 
futures prices (from the “first-nearby” futures contract – i.e., the contract that is closest to 
expiration at each point in time) on a daily basis going back to the inception of trading on the 
New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) in April 1990.  While the “twin peaks” of December 
2000 and February 2003 clearly dominate the graph and make the rest of the price history look 
comparatively tame, many of the “lesser” price spikes during the early 1990s represent doublings 
or more in price. 
 
                                                 
4 This potential explanation – which boils down to whether or not forward prices are unbiased estimators of future 
spot prices – has been widely debated in the literature and is interesting in its own right, independent of its 
implications for resource comparisons.  Accordingly, we devote a disproportionate amount of space to this topic. 
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Figure 1.  NYMEX Natural Gas Futures Prices (First-Nearby Contract) 
 
The path of natural gas prices depicted in Figure 1 is particularly troubling considering 
that at mid-2004 spot prices of around $6/MMBtu, the cost of natural gas accounts for more than 
70% the levelized cost of energy from a new combined cycle gas turbine, and more than 90% of 
its operating costs (EIA 2004).  Moreover, gas-fired plants are often the marginal units that set 
the market-clearing price for all generators in a competitive wholesale market, allowing natural 
gas price volatility to flow directly through to wholesale electricity price volatility.  Clearly, gas 
price volatility is a major contributor to wholesale electricity price volatility, and poses a major 
risk to both buyers and sellers of gas-fired generation.   
Electricity can be bought and sold either (1) on the spot market, (2) through contracts that 
are indexed to (i.e., vary with) the price of the fuel input,5 (3) through tolling agreements 
(whereby the power purchaser delivers fuel to the generator and takes delivery of the resulting 
power that is produced, having effectively “rented” the use of the generation plant), or (4) 
through fixed-price contracts.  Natural gas-fired generation is commonly sold through all four of 
these contract types (Bachrach et al. 2003), with gas price risk falling on the power purchaser in 
the first three, and the generator in the final type.  Renewable generation, on the other hand, is 
typically sold through long-term fixed-price contracts (perhaps indexed to inflation), and 
generally imposes no gas price risk on either the buyer or seller.  In order to achieve a fuel price 
risk profile similar to that of fixed-price renewable generation, either the buyer (under spot, 
indexed, and tolling contracts) or seller (under fixed-price contracts) of gas-fired generation must 
hedge away natural gas price risk. 
To hedge natural gas price risk, a retail electricity supplier can either purchase renewable 
generation (which is immune to gas price risk), purchase variable-priced gas-fired generation and 
choose among a number of gas-based financial and physical hedging instruments, or – if 
available – purchase fixed-price gas-fired generation (in which case the generator may wish to 
                                                 
5 Though fuel price indices are most common, electricity contracts may instead be linked to other price indices.  For 
example, an aluminum smelter wishing to stabilize its profit margin may seek an electricity contract that is indexed 
to the price of aluminum (i.e., the company’s output).  For the purposes of this article, we will assume that indexed 
contracts are linked to the price of the fuel input, natural gas. 
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hedge using financial or physical instruments).6  Financial gas-based hedges include futures (or, 
more generically, forwards), swaps, options on futures, or some combination or derivation 
thereof (e.g., collars).  Physical hedges include long-term fixed-price gas supply contracts and 
natural gas storage. 
To fairly evaluate fixed-price renewable and variable-price gas-fired contracts on an 
apples-to-apples basis with respect to fuel price risk, we must look to those gas-based hedging 
instruments that provide a hedged payout pattern similar to that of renewables – i.e., flat and 
symmetrical, immune to both gas price increases and decreases.  Bolinger et al. (2003) 
demonstrate that such instruments include gas futures, swaps, and fixed-price physical supply 
contracts, but not options or storage.  The prices that can be locked in through these instruments 
are therefore the appropriate fuel price input to modeling and planning studies that compare – 
either explicitly or implicitly – renewable to gas-fired generation. 
As shown in Bolinger et al. (2003), however, utilities and others conducting such 
analyses tend to rely primarily on uncertain long-term forecasts of spot natural gas prices, rather 
than on prices that can be locked in through futures, swap, or fixed-price physical supply 
contracts (i.e., “forward prices”).  This practice raises a critical question:  how do the prices 
contained in uncertain long-term gas price forecasts compare to actual forward prices that can be 
locked in?   
If the two price streams closely match one another, then one might conclude that 
forecast-based resource acquisition, planning, and modeling exercises are implicitly accounting 
for the price stability benefits of renewable relative to gas-fired generation, approximating an 
apples-to-apples comparison.  If, however, forward prices systematically differ from long-term 
spot price forecasts (e.g., if there is a cost to hedging, or if the forecasts are out of tune with 
market expectations), then the use of such forecasts in resource acquisition, planning, and 
modeling exercises will arguably yield results that are either (1) biased in favor of renewable 
generation (if forwards < forecasts), or (2) biased in favor of natural gas-fired generation (if 
forwards > forecasts). 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS OF A PREMIUM 
 
EIA Forecast Comparisons 
 
We first investigate the extent to which natural gas forward prices match price forecasts 
by comparing the prices of futures, swap, and fixed-price physical gas supply contracts to 
“reference case” gas price forecasts from the EIA.  The data necessary to conduct our analysis 
are simple:  a forward gas price and a gas price forecast, ideally generated at the same time.  
While long-term gas price forecasts are relatively easy to come by (e.g., the EIA forecasts are 
publicly available and updated every year), long-term forward prices – and in particular those of 
sufficient duration to be of interest – present a greater challenge.  The NYMEX gas futures strip 
extends out six years (but is liquid for much less than that) – a period that is only about one-third 
as long as the typical term of a power purchase agreement for renewable energy (which 
commonly extend 15-25 years).  Forward gas contracts in excess of 6 years are traded 
infrequently and, when traded, are traded bilaterally “over the counter” (i.e., not on an organized 
                                                 
6 Similarly, as noted earlier, investments in energy efficiency (e.g., through demand-side management), or even coal 
or nuclear power (with fuel costs that are quite stable compared to the cost of natural gas), may provide an 
equivalent natural gas price hedge.  For example, Humphreys and McClain (1998) use modern portfolio theory to 
demonstrate how a shift toward coal-fired generation could reduce wholesale electricity price volatility. 
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exchange), and are therefore rarely documented in the public domain.  In addition, we must 
further restrict our sample to those forward prices that were traded or posted at roughly the same 
time as the generation of a long-term gas price forecast (this timing issue will be discussed later).   
Thus, despite efforts to obtain a larger sample, our analysis is limited to comparisons 
based on publicly available data that we collected from November 2000-2003, and for forward 
price terms not exceeding 10 years.  Specifically, our limited sample of natural gas forward 
contracts and price forecasts includes:  
• 2-, 5-, and 10-year natural gas swaps offered by Enron in early November 2000 and 2001, 
compared to reference case natural gas price forecasts from the Energy Information 
Administration’s (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook 2001 and 2002, respectively; 
• the six-year NYMEX natural gas futures strip (averaged each year) from early November 
2002, compared to the reference case gas price forecast contained in Annual Energy 
Outlook 2003; 
• a seven-year physical gas supply contract between Williams and the California Department 
of Water Resources (DWR) signed in early November 2002, again compared to the 
reference case gas price forecast contained in Annual Energy Outlook 2003, and; 
• the six-year NYMEX natural gas futures strip from mid-October 2003, compared to the 
reference case gas price forecast contained in Annual Energy Outlook 2004. 
 
In each case, we evaluate these forward prices against the EIA’s reference case forecast 
of natural gas prices delivered to electricity generators (in nominal dollars7), which is generated 
in the fall of each year and presented in the Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) series released 
towards the end of the year.  Although the use of EIA reference case gas price forecasts for this 
purpose is somewhat controversial (as discussed later), we use them nonetheless because they are 
publicly available, have been widely vetted, and most importantly are commonly adopted by the 
EIA and others as a “base case” price scenario in policy evaluations, modeling exercises, and 
even resource acquisition decisions.   
To make a proper comparison between the EIA spot price forecasts (which represent the 
average price of gas delivered to electricity generators nationwide) and the Enron swap and 
NYMEX futures prices (which are indexed or deliverable to the Henry Hub in Louisiana), each 
year we subtract $0.38/MMBtu from the EIA spot price forecast to account for the average cost 
of transportation from the Henry Hub to electricity generators nationwide.8  We make the same 
adjustment in order to place the EIA forecast on the same terms as the Williams/DWR contract, 
which will result in delivery of natural gas to the Southern California border (i.e., we assume that 
prices at the Southern California border will, on average, match prices at the Henry Hub).9
                                                 
7 Unless otherwise noted, all forecasts are expressed in nominal (as opposed to real or constant dollar) terms in order 
to be comparable to forward prices, which are also expressed in nominal terms.  For example, we inflate the EIA gas 
price forecasts – which are expressed in real terms – to nominal terms using the EIA’s own inflation projections. 
8 This adjustment is necessary because the EIA does not provide a forecast of Henry Hub spot prices.  To estimate 
the average cost of transportation from the Henry Hub to electricity generators nationwide, we compared historic 
first-nearby NYMEX futures prices (which are indexed to the Henry Hub) to delivered (to electricity generators) 
spot prices on a monthly basis from April 1990 through December 2002 (n=153 months).8  This comparison 
revealed an average transportation margin of $0.38/MMBtu, with a 95% confidence interval that ranges from $0.33 
to $0.43/MMBtu. 
9 The locational basis differential between Southern California and the Henry Hub has varied over time in both sign 
and magnitude.  While it was strongly positive (i.e., prices in Southern California were sharply higher than at the 
Henry Hub) during the California energy crisis of 2000 and 2001, the basis has been consistently flat or slightly 
negative since late 2001.  As such, we simply assume here that the basis between Southern California and the Henry 
Hub will be flat (i.e., zero) over the duration of the Williams/DWR contract.  This assumption appears to be 
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Each of these comparisons reveals that forward natural gas prices have traded above EIA 
reference case price forecasts during this four-year period, sometimes significantly so.  Figure 2 
consolidates the resulting levelized premiums (in terms of $/MMBtu and ¢/kWh, assuming a heat 
rate of 7,000 Btu/kWh) from each of these comparisons into a single graph.10  As shown, the 
magnitude of the empirically derived premiums varies somewhat from year to year, contract to 
contract, and by contract term, ranging from $0.5-$0.8/MMBtu, or 0.4-0.6¢/kWh assuming a 
highly-efficient gas-fired power plant. 
 
igure 2.  Implied Premiums in $/MMBtu and ¢/kWh (assuming 7,000 Btu/kWh) 
While the relatively tight range of premiums is somewhat remarkable, the limitations in 
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a sample mean that one cannot easily extrapolate these findings beyond the four periods 
for which we have data, or to contract terms longer than those examined.  It is, however, at least
apparent that utilities and others who have conducted resource planning and modeling studies 
based on EIA reference case gas price forecasts from November 2000-2003 have produced 
“biased” results that favor variable-price gas-fired over fixed-price renewable generation, 
potentially to the tune of ~0.4-0.6¢/kWh on a levelized basis.  This is because an apples-to
apples comparison of renewable to gas-fired generation must be based on fuel prices that ca
locked in with certainty,11 which, as shown in Figure 2, have traded at a premium over uncertain 
fuel price forecasts during this period. 
 
consistent with, and perhaps even conservative relative to, historical post-crisis basis values (including at the time 
the contract was signed), as well as prices that can currently be locked in for the next 30 months through the forward 
market.  Thus, we compare the Williams/DWR contract prices to the same adjusted EIA forecast – i.e., reference 
case prices delivered to generators, less $0.38/MMBtu – as we used for the Enron and NYMEX comparisons. 
10 We derived the premiums by levelizing the first 2, 5, 6, 7, and 10 years of the EIA forecasts (using a discount rate 
of 10%) and subtracting the resulting levelized forecast price from the corresponding forward prices.  Because in 
this case levelizing involves taking the present value of a price stream and amortizing it forward at the same 
discount rate, the calculation is relatively insensitive to the level of the discount rate chosen.  For example, using a 
discount rate of 5% barely changed the results. 
11 Of course, even gas prices that are locked in through long-term contracts still carry default risk – for example, the 
risk that gas suppliers will default on their obligation to deliver gas in the event of a sustained price increase or some 
other unforeseen circumstance.  Renewable generators, which are typically not dependent on a fuel input supplied 
by others, need not bear this particular risk. 
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Other Forecasts 
 
The EIA’s forecasts are by no means the only long-term gas price forecasts available to 
arket participants.  In order to assess how the premiums presented in Figure 2 would change 
had we  
se forecast 
 
 
have ob  
nd gas-
ANATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL PREMIUMS 
000-2003 revealed in the previous section, and the implications such differences hold for 
resourc
ice 
ns 
 
r 
                                                
m
 compared natural gas forward prices to some forecast other than the EIA’s, we reviewed
a number of other long-term gas price forecasts, sourced from the EIA’s own forecast 
comparisons (contained in each year’s AEO), as well as from various utility integrated resource 
plans.12  As shown in Bolinger et al. (2003), with few exceptions, the EIA reference ca
has generally been higher – and often substantially so – than most other forecasts generated from
2000-2003 and used by utilities and others.  These findings suggest that the premiums presented 
in Figure 2 would be even larger when comparing forward prices to some of the other commonly 
used gas price forecasts.  Utilities and others that have used these other (i.e., non-EIA) forecasts 
to compare fixed-price renewable to variable-price gas-fired generation from 2000-2003 have 
therefore arguably obtained results that are even more “biased” (with respect to fuel price risk) in
favor of gas-fired generation than those resulting from EIA-based reference case comparisons. 
For example, had we compared the November 2001 Enron 10-year natural gas swap to 
the gas price forecast contained in Idaho Power’s 2002 Integrated Resource Plan,13 we would 
served a 10-year levelized premium of $1.29/MMBtu – i.e., nearly twice as large as the
$0.68/MMBtu benchmarked against the EIA reference case forecast.  This translates to a 
0.9¢/kWh premium at an aggressive heat rate of 7,000 Btu/kWh; had Idaho Power used forward 
rather than forecast data in its integrated resource plan, comparisons between renewable a
fired generation may have looked significantly different.  Though not as large in magnitude as 
the Idaho Power example, most other forecast comparisons yielded similar results (for details, 
see Bolinger et al. 2003).   
 
POTENTIAL EXPL
 
The differences between natural gas forwards and gas price forecasts from November 
2
e comparisons, are significant.  We are keenly aware, however, that these empirical 
results are based on limited historical data over a 4-year period characterized by extreme pr
volatility.  In considering whether it is possible to extrapolate our findings, or the implicatio
thereof, into the future, it is important to try to understand some of the causes of our empirical 
findings.  At least three explanations may partially or wholly account for the sizable differences
between natural gas forwards and forecasts:  (1) hedging is not costless, and the observed 
premiums represent the cost of hedging; (2) the forecasts are out of tune with market 
expectations, so the observed empirical premiums reflect forecast bias; and (3) other data o
sampling issues are driving the premium.  Below we assess each of these three broad 
possibilities. 
 
 
12 Specifically, we examined gas price forecasts contained in the most recent integrated resource plans from Avista 
(DRI-WEFA), Idaho Power (WEFA, November 2001), Pacificorp (PIRA, March 2002), Portland General Electric 
(EIA, November 2001), and Puget Sound Energy (PIRA, January 2003). 
13 The Idaho Power forecast is based on a November 2001 WEFA forecast, and is therefore compared to the gas 
price forecast contained in AEO 2002 (for the Mountain Region).   
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Hedging May Not Be Costless 
 
This potential explanation may have two components or causes:  (1) forward prices are 
upwardly biased predictors of future spot prices, and (2) transaction costs are significant.  The 
first notion, that forward prices are biased predictors of future spot prices, has been extensively 
debated in the literature ever since Keynes first introduced the idea of normal backwardation in 
his 1930 Treatise on Money. 
Specifically, Keynes (1930) argued that hedgers who use futures markets to mitigate 
commodity price risk must compensate speculators for the “insurance” that they provide.14  A 
futures market that is dominated by short hedgers – i.e., a market with more natural sellers than 
buyers of future contracts – results in what is known as positive net hedging pressure, and 
requires speculators to step in and purchase the excess futures contracts that are for sale in order 
to clear the market.  To entice speculators to provide this “insurance” or liquidity, short hedgers 
must, according to Keynes (1930), be willing to sell futures contracts to speculators at prices that 
are lower than the expected spot price, thereby enabling speculators to earn a positive return 
simply by buying the contracts and holding them to expiration (when spot and futures prices 
presumably converge).  The opposite occurs in a market dominated by long hedgers, resulting in 
negative net hedging pressure:  to clear the market, speculators must sell futures contracts, and 
are compensated in the form of futures prices that are higher than the expected spot price, again 
enabling them to earn a positive return simply by holding the short position to expiration. 
Over the years, a number of studies have attempted – with mixed results – to empirically 
confirm or refute the existence of risk premiums in futures prices by examining the returns to 
speculators.15  Much of this work, however, has been based on a strict application of Keynes’ 
theory, which, among other things, assumes that hedgers – characterized mainly as producers 
who are natural short hedgers – will be net short futures and that speculators will therefore be net 
long futures.  As explained above, this results in positive net hedging pressure, and futures 
contract prices that should, in theory, be below expected spot market prices (i.e., Keynes’ normal 
backwardation).  Under this constraint, one need only test for a positive return to holding futures 
contracts to see whether speculators have earned a risk premium.  This is the general approach 
taken by Telser (1958) and Gray (1961), who find no evidence of a risk premium in agricultural 
commodities such as corn, wheat, and cotton. 
As noted by Chang (1985), however, a number of researchers have relaxed this constraint 
in recognition that both producers and consumers hedge, and that net hedging pressure may 
therefore not always be positive (i.e., in aggregate, short hedges may not always outnumber long 
hedges).  Such researchers have generally incorporated information about the aggregate net 
                                                 
14 Hedgers can be thought of as commodity producers (e.g., farmers) or consumers (e.g., manufacturers) who have a 
natural underlying position in a commodity that can be hedged by selling or buying futures contracts.  A “short” 
hedge transaction is one in which the hedger currently owns the underlying commodity and will be selling it in the 
future (e.g., post-harvest), and so today sells futures contracts to lock in the future sales price of the commodity and 
thereby secure a profit margin.  Conversely, a “long” hedge transaction is one in which the hedger does not currently 
own the commodity but will be buying it in the future (e.g., as orders for finished goods increase), and so today buys 
futures contracts to lock in the future purchase price of the commodity and thereby secure a profit margin.  In 
contrast to hedgers, speculators have no natural underlying position in the commodity, and trade in the futures 
market purely to make a profit.  If a short hedger cannot find a long hedger to trade with, a speculator will step in to 
buy the short hedger’s futures contracts, in the hopes of being able to re-sell them at a profit.  In this way, 
speculators provide liquidity to the market. 
15 Due to the historical nature of the debate, which began in the 1930s, most of these studies deal primarily with 
agricultural commodities.  Studies focusing specifically on natural gas and wholesale electricity futures markets, 
which did not come into being until the 1990s, are discussed later. 
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position of hedgers into their analysis, checking for positive futures returns when net hedging 
pressure is positive, and negative futures returns when net hedging pressure is negative.  Though 
results remain inconclusive, the relaxation of the assumption that speculators are always net long 
has generally led to results, as reported in Chang (1985) and Hull (1999), that are more 
supportive of Keynes’ notion of a risk premium (positive or negative, depending on whether net 
hedging pressure is negative or positive, respectively) embedded in futures prices.  For example, 
Houthaker (1957), Cootner (1960), Carter et al. (1983), Chang (1985), and de Roon et al. (2000) 
all relax the assumption that speculators will be net long futures and find empirical evidence of 
risk premiums embedded in futures prices.16
Still other researchers have searched for risk premiums in commodity futures prices from 
within the framework of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  Under CAPM, it is not the 
variability of prices per se, but rather the correlation of price variability with changes in total 
wealth that impact the futures premium.  Dusak (1973) examined wheat, corn, and soybean 
futures within the CAPM framework, and found no evidence of either non-zero systematic risk 
or non-zero futures returns.17  Hirshleifer (1988), meanwhile, developed a model whereby the 
risk premium consists of two terms – a systematic risk term (i.e., related to CAPM) and a term 
due solely to residual risk (i.e., related to net hedging pressure). 
Below we examine in more detail the possibility that either net hedging pressure or 
CAPM-related systematic price risk is responsible for the empirical premiums observed in the 
natural gas market from November 2000-2003, as presented earlier.  We then consider the 
possibility – still within the context that there is a cost to hedging – that high transaction costs are 
driving at least a portion of the observed empirical premiums. 
 
Net Hedging Pressure in the Natural Gas Market 
 
A number of studies have examined the efficiency of the natural gas market specifically 
(i.e., whether gas futures prices are unbiased predictors of subsequent spot prices), and like the 
broader literature, have found mixed results.  Analyzing just the first few years of the NYMEX 
natural gas futures market (which began in April 1990), Herbert (1993) finds the market to be 
inefficient (futures prices > realized spot prices, suggesting a positive risk premium).  With a few 
more years of price history to examine, Walls (1995) finds the gas futures market to be generally 
efficient (futures prices = realized spot prices, suggesting no risk premium).  More recently, 
Buchanan et al. (2001) find evidence of positive returns to large natural gas speculators, and 
Chinn et al. (2001) find that natural gas future prices are a biased and poor predictor of future 
spot prices.18  Of course, all of these studies analyze short-term futures contracts, and it is not 
clear that their results can be extrapolated to the longer-dated futures of interest here. 
To test whether the positive premiums (natural gas forward prices that are higher than 
                                                 
16 We again note that none of these studies focus on energy commodities, though de Roon et al. (2000) do include 
crude and heating oil within a broad array of 20 commodities. 
17 Note that these findings do not rule out CAPM as a potentially useful tool for this purpose, since under CAPM, 
one would expect zero systematic risk to lead to no risk premium. 
18 In addition, though not directly related to natural gas, there has recently been some interesting work on this issue 
in the wholesale electricity markets.  Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) develop an equilibrium model that allows 
net hedging pressure to be either positive or negative, depending on both the variance and distribution (i.e., 
skewness) of wholesale electricity prices.  In testing their model, they – along with Pirrong and Jermakyan (2001) 
and Longstaff and Wang (2003) – find evidence of significant positive risk premiums in the PJM day-ahead 
wholesale electricity markets (i.e., day-ahead forward prices were priced at significantly higher levels than realized 
spot prices). 
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contemporaneous forecasts of spot prices) observed earlier could be the direct result of negative 
net hedging pressure, Figure 3 depicts net hedging pressure in the natural gas market from 1999 
through 2003.19  Though largely positive over this period (suggesting that futures prices should 
generally be lower than expected spot prices), net hedging pressure has clearly varied quite a bit, 
and has been negative at times.  Of particular interest to this study is the fact that during three of 
the four periods in which we sampled forward prices (November 2001, November 2002, and 
October 2003, as depicted by the shaded bars), net hedging pressure was either neutral or slightly 
negative (i.e., suggesting futures prices should match or be higher than expected spot prices).  In 
the fourth sample period – November 2000 – net hedging pressure was clearly positive, though 
not nearly to the degree seen earlier in that and the previous year. 
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Figure 3.  Net Hedging Pressure in the Natural Gas Futures Market, 1999-2003 
 
Thus, while Figure 3 does not support the idea that negative net hedging pressure is 
directly responsible for the positive premiums observed earlier in this article, it does show a 
notable lack of positive net hedging pressure during our sample period.  In other words, net 
hedging pressure appears to provide little support either for or against our specific findings of 
significant positive premiums in the natural gas market from November 2000 – 2003.  More 
generally, however, the fact that net hedging pressure is not uniformly negative suggests that one 
should not expect – at least on the basis of net hedging pressure alone – such positive premiums 
to exist at all times. 
 
Systematic Risk in Natural Gas Prices 
 
Setting aside net hedging pressure and the returns of speculators, what if producers 
benefited from price volatility, while consumers were hurt by it?  In this case, producers would 
require compensation (i.e., a premium) for being locked into long-term fixed-price contracts, and 
                                                 
19 The data come from the weekly Commitments of Traders reports published by the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC).  Traders are classified as “commercial” or “non-commercial” depending on whether their 
futures positions in a given commodity are used for hedging or speculative purposes, respectively.  Net hedging 
pressure is defined as the difference between the number of outstanding short and long contracts divided by the sum 
of outstanding short and long contracts (among commercial traders).  Commercial traders (i.e., hedgers) regularly 
account for 60-75% of the open interest in the natural gas futures market. 
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consumers would be willing to pay such compensation.  Economic theory provides some support 
for this very scenario in the form of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).20
While CAPM was originally derived as a financial tool to be applied to investment 
portfolios, its basic tenet – that an asset’s risk depends on the correlation of its revenue stream 
with variability in the asset-holder’s overall wealth – can be applied much more broadly, for 
example in evaluating investments in physical assets such as power plants (Awerbuch 1993, 
1994; Kahn & Stoft 1993).  Specifically, in the context of natural gas-fired generation, one can 
think about the correlation between a gas consumer’s overall wealth (as proxied by the economy 
or, more specifically, the stock market) and natural gas prices.  If gas prices, and therefore 
consumer expenditures on gas, rise as the stock market declines (e.g., because rising gas prices 
hurt the economy), then natural gas is said to have a negative “beta,”21 and is risky to gas 
consumers and beneficial to gas producers.  In other words, at the same time as gas consumers 
and producers feel the pinch of a weak stock market, expenditures on natural gas also rise, 
compounding overall wealth depletion among consumers while providing some consolation to 
producers.22
In this specific case, where gas with a negative beta is risky to consumers and beneficial 
to producers, consumers have an incentive to hedge natural gas price risk, while producers do 
not.  Intuitively, it follows that even if both consumers and producers share identical expectations 
of future spot gas prices, producers will still require – and consumers will be willing to pay – a 
premium over expected spot prices in order to lock in those prices today.  Both Pindyck (2001) 
and Hull (1999) mathematically demonstrate this to be the case:  when beta is negative, futures 
prices should, at least theoretically, trade at a premium to expected spot prices. 
Thus, if the beta of natural gas is indeed negative, this theory might explain our empirical 
observations of a positive premium embedded in contract prices.  One can test this notion by 
regressing natural gas price changes against stock market returns.  Below we survey past efforts 
to quantify the beta of natural gas, report results from our own analysis, and then reconcile our 
regression results with our empirical findings. 
 
Past Estimates of Beta 
Literature from the early 1990s supports the existence of a negative beta for natural gas.  
Kahn and Stoft (1993) regressed spot wellhead gas prices against the S&P 500 using annual data 
from 1980 through the first 6 months of 1992 and arrived at an estimate of beta of -0.78 (±0.27 
standard error).  Awerbuch has written several papers advocating the use of risk-adjusted 
discount rates for evaluating investments in generation assets; in them he usually cites a natural 
gas beta ranging from -1.25 to -0.5 (Awerbuch 1993, 1994).  Awerbuch (1994) also cites another 
study from 1993 (by Talbot) as having found a natural gas beta of -0.45. 
More recent literature surrounding the beta of energy commodities has focused on crude 
                                                 
20 For a good introduction to CAPM, see Brealey and Myers (1991). 
21 In its original application to the stock market, beta represents the risk premium of a particular stock, and is related 
in a linear fashion to that stock’s market risk (i.e., beta = expected risk premium on stock / expected risk premium 
on entire market).  Stocks that carry the same market risk as the entire stock market (i.e., stocks whose returns are 
perfectly correlated with those of the broad market) have a beta of 1, while stocks that are perfectly uncorrelated 
with the market have a beta of 0.  Similarly, stocks that are riskier than the market as a whole have betas > 1, while 
stocks that are negatively correlated with the market have betas < 0.  While assets with a negative beta are desirable 
for diversification purposes, liabilities with a negative beta are undesirable for the same reason.  In the case of 
natural gas, the producer holds the asset (and benefits from a negative beta) while the consumer is faced with a 
liability (and is hurt by a negative beta). 
22 Of course, sustained gas price increases may ultimately not benefit gas producers, as higher gas prices will induce 
substitution away from gas towards cheaper fuels. 
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oil, whose price should be at least moderately correlated with natural gas prices.  Sadorsky 
(1999) and Papapetrou (2001) both conclude that there is a negative correlation between changes 
in oil prices and stock returns (i.e., that oil exhibits a negative beta).  Sauter and Awerbuch 
(2002) provide an extensive survey of the literature regarding oil’s impact on both the economy 
and stock markets, while Awerbuch (2003) estimates that the historical betas of coal, gas, and oil 
in the European Union are on the order of -0.4, -0.1, and -0.05, respectively.23
On the other hand, Pindyck (2001) – though not specifically investigating beta – notes 
(without citation) that estimates of beta for crude oil have been in the range of +0.5 to +1.0, and 
qualitatively explains why one should expect to see positive betas – strong economic growth 
leads to higher prices for industrial commodities.  While qualitatively plausible, this intuition 
that strong economic growth puts upward pressure on commodity prices (resulting in a positive 
beta) is no more or less believable than the opposing view that high commodity prices put a 
damper on economic growth (resulting in a negative beta) – both interpretations merely represent 
successive phases of the economic cycle.24  
 
Our Estimate of Beta 
Seeking an updated estimate of the beta of natural gas, we regressed historical percentage 
changes in natural gas prices delivered to electricity generators (from the EIA) against historical 
percentage changes in the S&P 500 index.  We choose to work with delivered (rather than 
wellhead) prices in an attempt to capture the full risk facing gas-fired generators:  volatility in 
both wellhead prices and transportation costs.25  Like Kahn and Stoft (1993), we first attempted 
to use monthly data (going back to January 1979), but were unable to correct for seasonality 
despite employing several different approaches.  As a result, we too retreated to using annual 
averages, which remove seasonality yet also mask intra-year movements and greatly restrict 
sample size.  We corrected for autocorrelation using the Hildreth-Lu procedure. 
Figure 4 graphically displays our estimate of beta over time.  The dashed line represents a 
“cumulative” estimate of beta, resulting from progressively longer-term regressions as one 
moves forward in time.26  The gray shaded area represents a 90% confidence interval around our 
central estimate of cumulative beta.  Meanwhile, to illustrate shorter-term variations, the solid 
line represents a rolling 10-year estimate of beta.27
As shown, our cumulative estimate of beta (the dashed line) is, not surprisingly, fairly 
stable over time, typically ranging from -0.2 to -0.4, yet coming to rest in 2002 at -0.1 – lower in 
                                                 
23 It is somewhat counterintuitive that the beta of coal is found to be more negative than the beta of gas, given that 
the price of natural gas is generally perceived to be much more volatile than the price of coal.  Price regulation in the 
European Union may partially explain this apparent distortion. 
24 This ambiguity brings to light two problems that arise in estimating beta using CAPM – defining what constitutes 
“the market” (i.e., the stock market or the broader economy), and using coincident regressions to describe 
relationships that are dependent on lead/lag cycles.  For example, Pindyck’s intuition that economic growth puts 
upward pressure on industrial commodity prices implies a positive beta with the economy.  Yet if the stock market 
tends to anticipate economic cycles, then the stock market may begin to decline just as economic growth is pushing 
commodity prices higher, implying a negative beta with the stock market.  Moreover, if the stock market’s lead time 
over the economy (generally thought to be from 9-12 months) undergoes a long-term secular shift (e.g., as access to 
information improves), historical estimates of beta may not hold much meaning for the future. 
25 As demonstrated during the California energy crisis of 2000/2001, locational basis risk can be substantial:  while 
Henry Hub gas prices peaked at around $10/MMBtu, prices delivered to the Southern California Border exceeded 
$50/MMBtu. 
26 This is essentially a rolling regression with a fixed starting point; i.e., the first estimate of cumulative beta shown 
(in 1989) results from a 10-year regression, while the 1990 estimate is from an 11-year regression, the 1991 estimate 
is from a 12-year regression, and so on building up to a 23-year regression in 2002. 
27 This line is simply the result of a 10-year rolling regression; i.e., each year looks only at the past 10 years. 
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magnitude than estimates from the early 1990s,28 but still slightly negative.  Even so, the 90% 
confidence interval, while skewed to the negative side of zero, is fairly wide and does not rule 
out the possibility of a positive beta, particularly from 1996 on.  In fact, it is clear from both the 
confidence interval and the rolling 10-year estimate of beta that Awerbuch and others who 
looked at gas betas in the early 1990’s were doing so at perhaps the optimal moment to conclude 
a negative beta.  Since that time, the confidence interval has widened considerably – the opposite 
of what one would expect as sample size increases – and the rolling 10-year beta has oscillated 
between negative and positive territory.  Thus, while the cumulative beta shown in Figure 4 
appears to have historically been negative, it would be unwise to conclude that this will always 
be the case. 
 
igure 4.  Estimate Of Beta Of Natural Gas Delivered To Electricity Generators 
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Using our sample of forward prices and EIA reference cas
e to back into empirical estimates of the beta for natural gas.  These are the specific b
that would be required to fully explain our empirically derived discrepancy between natural gas 
forward and forecast prices within the context of CAPM.  To do this, one must assume that the 
forward prices are “riskless” (i.e., known in advance and able to be locked in), while the price 
streams represented by the EIA gas forecasts are “risky” (i.e., merely a forecast and bound to b
wrong).  One then calculates the present value of both price streams – the forward market price 
stream using the known “riskless” discount rate (i.e., the U.S. Treasury bill yield at the time), an
the EIA forecast price stream using whatever discount rate results in the same present value as 
the discounted forward market price stream.  The difference between the resulting empirically 
derived risk-adjusted discount rate and the known “riskless” discount rate is then divided by the
“market risk premium” – i.e., the historic out-performance of risky assets (stocks) over riskless 
assets (T-bills) – to yield beta.29
 
28 Our cumulative estimate of beta through 1992 is less than half that estimated by Kahn and Stoft (1993) due to 
different data sources as well as our use of delivered prices instead of wellhead prices. 
29 Since by definition Rrisk-adjusted = Rrisk-free + ß * Market Risk Premium, then ß = (Rrisk-adjusted - Rrisk-free) / Market Risk 
Premium. 
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Performing this exercise using our sample of forward market prices and EIA reference 
case fo
able 1.  Empirical Estimates of the Beta of Natural Gas 
ar 10-Year 
recasts, and data on the historic returns of stocks and T-bills going back to 1926 from 
Ibbotson (2002),30 we arrive at the various estimates of beta presented in Table 1. 
 
T
 2-Year 5-Year 6-Year 7-Ye
Enron-AEO2001 -1.80 -1.23 N/A N/A -0.66 
Enron-AEO2002 -2.39 -0.98 N/A N/A -0.40 
NYMEX-AEO2003  -1.88 -0.79 -0.59 N/A N/A 
Williams-AEO2003 -2.00 -0.91 -0.72 -0.56 N/A 
NYMEX-AEO2004 -1.59 -0.57 -0.44 N/A N/A 
 
The empirical estimates of beta presented in Table 1 are, at least for the longer-term 
forward as 
  It is also 
, we are nevertheless hesitant to place too 
much f
ios – 
 to 
 
f a 
n 
 spot 
ransaction Costs 
Transaction costs provide yet another potential explanation in support of the idea that 
those hedging gas price risk will incur incremental costs relative to market expectations of future 
spot prices.  In commodity markets, transaction costs are manifested in the “bid-offer spread”:  
the spread between the price at which one is willing to buy (bid) and sell (offer) a product.  To 
                                 
 contracts, close to the regression estimates presented in Figure 4, which estimate bet
of -0.40 through 2000, -0.26 through 2001, and -0.10 through 2002.  This degree of similarity 
suggests that the fact that longer-term natural gas forwards were priced higher than 
contemporaneous EIA price forecasts from 2000-2003 may be explained by CAPM.
evident, however, that the shorter-term forward contracts yield progressively more negative 
estimates of beta (as low as –2.39 for the November 2001 2-year swap) as the contract term 
declines, which is largely inconsistent with CAPM.31
As theoretically appealing as CAPM may seem
aith in CAPM as the sole explanation for our empirical findings, for several reasons.  
First, CAPM formally requires that each individual’s portfolio be fully diversified so that only 
market risk remains.  Kahn and Stoft (1993) note that this may not be the case for the 
management of gas-producing companies, whose careers and reputation (if not portfol
witness Enron’s retirement plan, which was heavily invested in Enron stock) are closely tied
the profitability of the firm, and who therefore may view gas price volatility as risky even if it is
negatively correlated with the stock market.  Second, if CAPM were a dominant influence, then 
one would expect past studies of the efficiency of the natural gas futures market to regularly 
demonstrate a systematic positive difference between futures and realized spot prices.  As 
discussed earlier, this is not the case:  some, but not all, of these studies do show evidence o
premium, but in some cases the sign of the premium varies with net hedging pressure, rather tha
always being positive as would be required under CAPM with a negative beta.  Thus, while 
CAPM may be a contributor towards natural gas futures prices that are in excess of expected
prices, other factors are likely at work as well. 
 
T
 
                
30 Ibottson (2002) calculates that the average compound annual return of T-bills and large stocks (similar to the S&P 
500) from 1926 through 2001 is 3.8% and 10.7% respectively, which yields a “market risk premium” (i.e., the 
average annual return of stocks over bills) of 6.65% (i.e., (1+10.7%)/(1+3.8%)-1 = 6.65%). 
31 Perhaps over shorter terms (i.e., 2 years), the comparison of forward market prices to a long-term gas price 
forecast – which is by nature not very sensitive to changes in spot or short-term futures markets – is less valid. 
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 a deal with minimal price risk (i.e., the risk that the market price rises (falls) while one
trying to buy (sell)), one must typically “cross” the bid-offer spread (i.e., pay the offering price 
(if buying) or accept the bid price (if selling)).  Since the “true” market price lies somewhere in 
between the bid and the offer, crossing the bid-offer spread to execute a deal results in 
transaction costs being incurred (i.e., paying more, or receiving less, than the “true” market 
price).  For analytical purposes, the size of the transaction cost of buying or selling in a market i
typically considered to be half the size of the bid-offer spread in that market (under the 
assumption that the “true” market price lies half way in between the bid and the offer). 
In liquid markets, transaction costs (i.e., bid-offer spreads) are typically very small, a
of little concern.  In less-liquid markets (or even thinly traded segments of otherwise liquid 
markets), however, bid-offer spreads can be quite wide, and can have a more significant
on the cost of transactions. 
How high are transaction costs in the long-term natural gas market?  While we do not 
have sufficient data on long-dated forwards to say, we can at least examine bid-offer spreads
the “highly liquid” but shorter-term NYMEX futures market.  Figure 5 depicts typical bid-offer 
spreads over the first 36 con
ts.32  For a trade size of 30 contracts executed under normal market conditions,33 bid-of
spreads in the first four futures contracts (i.e., representing delivery in each of the next four 
months) are immaterial.  Moving beyond these first few very liquid contracts, however, the bid-
offer spread increases ten-fold out to 36 months, as liquidity (proxied here by open interest
declines.  Beyond these first 36 months (NYMEX gas futures are listed out 72 months), NYMEX 
gas futures are very thinly traded (open interest essentially drops to zero), making it costly or
even difficult to complete a trade of this size (Waller 2002). 
 
 
32 “Open interest” represents the number of open or outstanding contracts to the exchange (i.e., contracts that have 
not been closed out either through an offsetting position or via delivery).  Volume – i.e., the number of contracts that 
changed hands in a given day – is perhaps a better measure of liquidity, though it is also more sensitive to the 
particular day chosen (e.g., on the Friday before a 3-day holiday weekend, volume may be very light, but open 
interest will likely be relatively unchanged from normal levels). 
33 Trade size and market conditions are relevant because the bid-offer spread will increase with trade size as well as 
during periods of heightened price volatility.  By way of reference, 30 contracts per month is roughly equivalent to 
the amount of gas needed to fuel an 85 MW combined-cycle gas turbine (heat rate of 7,000 Btu/kWh) operating at a 
70% capacity factor.  A gas plant that is twice as large (170 MW) would obviously require twice as many contracts 
(i.e., 60) to fully hedge gas price risk (or could use the original 30 contracts to hedge half of its risk). 
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Figure 5.  Typical Bid-Offer Spread and Open Interest for NYMEX Natural Gas Futures 
 
Although the bid-offer spread shown in Figure 5 widens dramatically as liquidity declines 
along the strip, the absolute numbers shown (~1.5% of the contract price at its widest) are 
admittedly small.  That said, the bid-offer spread curve in Figure 5 does not extend beyond 36 
months because beyond this point there is very little liquidity on which to base a reliable 
estimate.  In other words, beyond 36 months, there is not necessarily “a market” per se, and the 
cost of deal execution depends largely on the ability to locate a willing buyer or seller, which 
may require significant price concessions at times. 
Given the steep slope of the bid-offer spread curve over the first 36 contracts, one would 
expect deals with longer maturities to have even higher transaction costs.  Unfortunately, we do 
not have sufficient data to confirm this notion.  When asked for an indication of a bid-offer 
spread on a 20-year natural gas swap, however, one Enron gas trader estimated that 
$0.50/MMBtu would be a reasonable ballpark estimate.  While the sheer magnitude of this spread 
is most likely an indication that no one trades natural gas swaps out that far, it nonetheless 
exemplifies the significant impact that transaction costs can have in illiquid markets.  This 
impact has likely not been adequately captured by the existing net hedging pressure and efficient 
market literature cited earlier, which focuses almost exclusively on short-term natural gas futures 
contracts, rather than the long-term forwards in which we are interested.  If the transaction costs 
of buying and selling long-term forward contracts are significant, then empirical studies of the 
returns earned by speculators on long-term forward contracts may yield results that are far more 
conclusive than those presented earlier for short-term contracts. 
 
The Forecasts May Be Out of Tune with Market Expectations 
 
Another possible explanation for our empirically derived premiums between gas forwards 
and forecasts is related to the forecasts themselves, which may have been biased downwards or 
otherwise inconsistent with market expectations of spot gas prices from November 2000-2003.  
Proponents of this explanation might argue that forward prices should represent the market’s 
view of future spot gas prices, and therefore that there is no incremental cost of hedging gas price 
volatility.  Therefore, any real (i.e., not due to data problems) positive difference between gas 
forwards and gas price forecasts must represent a downward bias in the forecasts relative to the 
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market’s view of future spot prices. 
For example, perhaps the U.S. natural gas industry has recently run into a serious short-
term supply constraint that has shifted gas prices (and the market’s expectations of future gas 
prices) into a new regime, and this paradigm has not been reflected in EIA reference case gas 
price forecasts generated from November 2000-2003; the EIA itself appears to both acknowledge 
and dispute such a scenario.34  Furthermore, given that the EIA’s reference case gas price 
forecasts were at the high end of the range relative to other common industry price forecasts over 
this period, this explanation directly takes issue not only with the EIA reference case forecast, 
but also with virtually every other publicly available gas price forecast from November 2000-
2003.35
While this explanation is certainly plausible, particularly in light of the considerable 
market turmoil over this period, it cannot be directly supported or refuted by our data.  The 
EIA’s own evaluation of the accuracy of its past AEO forecasts has found that “As a general 
rule, the rate of increase in nominal energy prices has been overestimated rather than 
underestimated” (Sanchez 2003).  Specifically, an examination of the accuracy of past gas price 
forecasts (from the past twenty-one AEOs) reveals that, except in the years 2000-2002, AEO gas 
price forecasts have consistently overestimated (not underestimated) the actual spot price of gas 
for the past eighteen years (Sanchez 2003).  While these historic results may in no way be 
indicative of future trends, the weight of history nevertheless does not lend ready support to the 
view that the EIA’s reference case natural gas price forecast is systematically biased downwards 
relative to the market’s expectation of future natural gas prices.  
Another possibility is that our use of such forecasts as proxies for the market’s view of 
future spot gas prices is altogether inappropriate.  For example, the EIA notes that its “reference 
case” forecast assumes that normal inventories and weather, as well as current laws and 
regulations, will hold throughout the forecast period, and therefore that the reference case 
forecast does not necessarily reflect what the EIA believes to be “most likely.”  In fact, the EIA 
does not assign probabilities to any of the forecasts it generates, so the “high economic growth 
case” forecast might be considered just as likely as the “reference case” or even “low economic 
growth case” forecast, for example.  Furthermore, by assuming away weather and inventory 
variability, and possible changes in regulations – all of which have a major impact on prices – 
the EIA notes that it is not really forecasting prices at all, but rather long-term equilibrium 
costs.36   
While the EIA reference case forecast may not be designed to represent EIA or market 
expectations of future gas prices, it deserves note that industry participants and energy analysts 
                                                 
34 We noted with interest the following text accompanying the EIA’s early release of AEO 2004:  “For almost 4 
years, natural gas prices have remained at levels substantially higher than those of the 1990s. This has led to a 
reevaluation of expectations about future trends in natural gas markets, the economics of exploration and 
production, and the size of the natural gas resource. The Annual Energy Outlook 2004 (AEO2004) forecast reflects 
such revised expectations….”  This statement seems to suggest two things:  (1) that the EIA believes that its AEO 
2004 gas price forecast reflects upwardly revised market expectations concerning future gas prices, and (2) by 
extension, that the previous three years of AEO gas price forecasts may not have.  It is interesting, therefore, that the 
NYMEX-AEO 2004 comparison shown earlier in Figure 2 reveals a positive price premium that is largely consistent 
with those found in the previous three years. 
35 While it is certainly possible that virtually all gas price forecasts have been biased downwards (relative to market 
expectations of future spot prices) over the 2000-2003 time period, especially given likely similarities between the 
various models behind each forecast, the “absolute” nature of this consideration is nonetheless worth noting.  If true, 
this explanation would call into question the use of virtually all long-term gas price forecasts generated from 2000-
2003 for any purpose. 
36 We note, however, that Annual Energy Outlook uses the term “price” instead of “cost” to describe its forecasts. 
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regularly adopt the EIA reference case projection as a “best estimate” of future energy outcomes; 
in fact, the EIA itself regularly uses its reference case forecast as the “base-case” forecast when 
evaluating the cost and impacts of energy policies.  Furthermore, Bolinger et al. (2003) 
demonstrate that some utilities – one important segment of the gas market – are relying on EIA 
reference case forecasts as a “best estimate” of future gas prices for the purpose of long-term 
resource planning. 
On a related note, some have argued that “reference case” gas price forecasts can best be 
thought of as modes (i.e., the single scenario that the forecaster believes to be the most likely) 
rather than means (i.e., a probability weighted average of all possible spot prices), and since 
market expectations are by definition mean expectations, reference case gas price forecasts 
cannot represent market expectations.  While this argument does not hold for the EIA reference 
case forecast, which as described above may be neither a mean nor a mode, the implications of 
this argument are nonetheless worth noting.  Specifically, since gas prices are generally believed 
to be lognormally distributed or positively skewed, the mean must lie above the mode, meaning 
that true market expectations must be higher than reference case gas-price forecasts (if those 
forecasts do indeed represent the mode).  If this argument is accurate, it might explain some or 
all of the premium we have observed between forward prices and price forecasts.  More 
importantly, however, this argument calls into question why utilities and others would ever place 
significant emphasis on the use of reference case gas price forecasts in modeling and planning 
exercises.  By doing so, they would be systematically underestimating the market’s expectations 
of future gas prices, thereby erroneously making gas-fired generation appear to be cheaper than it 
is likely to be on average. 
 
Other Data Issues May Be Driving the Premium 
 
A final possible explanation for our findings is simply that our analysis is plagued by data 
issues that prohibit a meaningful comparison between natural gas forward prices and price 
forecasts.  While we have previously raised the possibility that forecast problems are at least 
partly responsible for the premium, it is also possible that the other half of the equation – the 
forward price – is upwardly biased.  Or, even if the forward price and price forecast are unbiased, 
it is possible that potential changes in the market between when the forward prices were sampled 
and the forecasts were generated could account for some or all of the observed premiums. 
The two main potential concerns with our forward price sample – and particularly prices 
from Enron and Williams, as the NYMEX is a regulated exchange37 – are price manipulation 
(given the role that both Enron and Williams allegedly played in precipitating California’s 
electricity crisis) and credit risk (given Enron’s impending bankruptcy in November 2001).  As 
shown in Bolinger et al. (2003), however, Enron 2-year swap prices from both November 2000 
and 2001 are entirely consistent with the NYMEX strip at the time, implying that at least on the 
short end of the forward curve, Enron’s prices were not biased upwards.  Furthermore, any credit 
risk in the November 2001 price sample would lead to lower, not higher prices, as the buyer 
would require compensation for accepting Enron’s credit risk. 
                                                 
37 Though they are likely less susceptible to manipulation than are over-the-counter prices, NYMEX prices are not 
totally beyond question.  As noted earlier, liquidity is extremely poor in the later years of the NYMEX gas futures 
strip, with several of the longest-dated contracts never having traded.  The NYMEX has a somewhat involved 
procedure for calculating settlement prices for such illiquid contracts that involves considering the spread 
relationships between the contract in question and more actively traded contracts.  Without considering the merits of 
this approach, it is worth noting that in the absence of actual trades (or at least strong bids and offers) it may not be 
possible to buy or sell a long-dated gas futures contract at or near the NYMEX settlement price. 
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Timing mismatch also does not appear to be a factor.  Two to three weeks passed 
between when the AEO 2001 and AEO 2002 gas price forecasts were finalized and when we 
were able to sample Enron swap prices in Novembers 2000 and 2001, respectively.  An 
examination of long-dated NYMEX gas futures contracts over this interim period shows very 
little price movement, implying that there were no fundamental shifts in market expectations 
between when the forecasts were finalized and when the forward prices were sampled.  
Meanwhile, our November 2002 and October 2003 forward price samples were essentially 
coincident with the finalization of the AEO 2003 and AEO 2004 gas price forecasts, 
respectively. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
A comparison of long-term natural gas forward prices and EIA reference case natural gas 
price forecasts from November 2000-2003 reveals that long-term forward prices have traded 
above EIA price forecasts during this four-year period.  As shown in Figure 2 earlier, the 
magnitude of the empirically derived premiums ranges from $0.5-$0.8/MMBtu, or 0.4-0.6¢/kWh 
assuming a highly efficient gas-fired power plant.  Furthermore, in recent years the EIA 
reference case gas price forecasts have typically been higher – and often substantially so – than 
most other forecasts that are commonly used by utilities and others in resource acquisition, 
modeling, and planning exercises.  Thus, the premiums observed relative to the EIA reference 
case forecasts would be even larger when comparing forward prices to some of the other 
forecasts commonly used in the electricity industry.   
While one cannot easily extrapolate these findings beyond the time period of our data 
(2000-2003), or to contract terms longer than those examined (2-10 years), it is at least apparent 
that utilities and others who have conducted resource acquisition, planning, and modeling studies 
based on EIA reference case (as well as other) gas price forecasts from November 2000-2003 
have arguably produced “biased” results that favor variable-price gas-fired over fixed-price 
renewable generation, potentially to the tune of ~0.4-0.6¢/kWh levelized.  This is because if 
consumers are rational and value price stability, then the cost of fixed-price renewable generation 
should be compared to the hedged or guaranteed cost of natural gas-fired generation, rather than 
to projected costs based on uncertain gas price forecasts.   
The cause of the premiums is less apparent.  We explored three potential explanations for 
our empirical findings – that hedging is not costless, that the forecasts are biased, and that other 
data issues are plaguing our analysis – and found each of them to be neither fully satisfying nor 
easily refutable.  Regardless of the explanation, however, the basic implication of our study for 
renewable energy (or any other energy source that is immune to natural gas fuel price risk) 
remains the same:  one should not blindly rely on gas price forecasts when comparing the 
levelized costs of fixed-price renewable to variable-price gas-fired generation contracts.  If there 
is a cost to hedging, gas price forecasts do not capture and account for it.  Alternatively, if gas 
price forecasts are at risk of being biased or out of tune with the market, then one certainly would 
not want to use them as the basis for investment decisions or resource comparisons if a better 
source of data (i.e., forwards) existed.  Accordingly, in virtually all cases, the most 
comprehensive way to compare the levelized costs of renewable and gas-fired generation would 
be to use forward natural gas price data as opposed to natural gas price forecasts. 
Of course, given widespread credit concerns and the retrenchment of trading desks across 
the United States in the wake of Enron’s collapse, data availability is likely to be an issue.  In 
particular, beyond the six years of publicly available NYMEX futures prices, long-term forward 
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gas price data may be hard to come by.  Where forward price data from actual contracts are not 
publicly available, utilities and policymakers may still have access to (or be in a position to 
solicit) data that are not in the public domain.  Alternatively, natural gas-fired generators may be 
willing to internalize any cost of hedging (or take on fuel price risk) and offer a long-term fixed-
price electricity contract similar to that provided by most renewable generators, thereby 
obviating the need for a utility or regulator to collect forward gas price data for the purpose of 
addressing fuel price risk.  Should these two suggestions fail, a second-best approach may be to 
start with the six-year NYMEX strip (appropriately adjusted for locational basis if necessary) 
and then transition to a long-term gas price forecast (or perhaps some average of multiple long-
term forecasts) in the seventh year and thereafter.  The transition between the NYMEX and 
forecast prices could be made by simply switching to the forecast price in year seven, or 
alternatively by applying the escalation rates implied in the long-term forecast to the year six 
NYMEX price. 
Finally, as a last resort, if all else fails, utilities and others may wish to adjust forecast gas 
prices upwards to account for the fact that forward prices have, potentially for reasons discussed 
above, traded above price forecasts in recent years.  While the analysis in this report suggests 
that an adjustment ranging from $0.5-$0.8/MMBtu (0.4-0.6¢/kWh at a heat rate of 7,000 
Btu/kWh) is a reasonable starting point, we emphasize that these premiums were calculated with 
respect to EIA reference case price forecasts from 2000 to 2003, for terms ranging from 2-10 
years.  If using a different gas price forecast, a higher or lower adjustment may be warranted.  
Likewise, this historically derived premium may well vary in the future, and may vary with 
contract terms longer than 10 years.  For these reasons, this approach is inferior to those 
previously mentioned, though it may still be superior to simply relying on forecast prices, which 
– at least in recent years – have been shown to be significantly below forward prices. 
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